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[L. A. No. 19479. In Bank. June 18, 194ft] 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. 
MAUD 'M. STARLEY. Respondent. 
[la,1b] Da.mages - Compensatory - Mitigation and Reduction of 
Loss. - Where a person sUfIers personal injury or property 
damage by reason of the wrongful act of another, an action 
against the wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not precluded 
nor is the amount of the damages reduced by the receipt by 
him of payment for his loss from a source wholly independent 
of the wrongdocl. This rule is applicable to a case where 
a shipper. who has been compensated by the carrier under 
Civ. Code. § 2194, sues the driver of a car which ran into the 
carrier's truck while transporting goods of the shipper. thereby 
damaging the shipper'!; ~oods. 
[2] Carriers - Property - Lia.bility for Loss or lnjury.-The lia-
bility of a common cllrrier to the owner for damage to prop-
erty in transit under a contract to transport is practically 
absolute. His liability is that of a limited insurer whether it 
be said to be contractual, statutory or tort. 
[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 779; 15 Am.Jur. 615. 
[2] See 4 Cal.Jur. 868; 9 Am.Jur. 813. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Damages, § 29; [2] Carriers, 524; 
[3] Negligence, §33; [4] Parties, §12(1). 
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[8] Negligence - Oontributo1'1 Negligence. - In an action by a 
shipper against the driver of an automobile which collided 
with a Clommon carrier's truck, resulting in damage to the 
shipper's goods, the contributory negligence of the Clarrier is a 
d~fense where it has paid the shipper the loss suffered. 
[4) Partiell-Plaintiff-Real Party in IntereBt,-An action by a 
shipper to recover damages to goods when the carrier's truck 
collided with defendant's automobile was maintained by the 
renl party in interest, although plaintiff had been compen-
sated by the carrier for the loss sustained. 
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County. Robert H. Scott, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages to shipment of goods resulting from 
collision of motor truck with another vehicle. Judgment for 
defendant entered on a directed verdict, reversed. 
Elbert E. Hensley and John H. Klenke for Appellant. 
Sigurd E. Murphy, George Finucane and Francis D. Thorn.-
ton for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for de-
fendant entered on a directed verdict. 
Denver-Chicago Trucking Company, hereinafter referred 
to as carrier, was engaged as a common carrier, in the trans-
portation by truck of personal property owned by plaintiff. 
In the course thereof defendant's car collided with the car-
rier's truck containing the property, resulting in a partial 
destruction of the property. Prior to the commencement of 
this action the carrier paid plaintiff's claim for the damage 
to the property presumably under the law providing: "Unless 
the consignor accompani~ the freight and retains exclusive 
control thereof. an inland common carrier of property is liable, 
from the time that he accepts until he relieves himself from 
liability pursuant to sections two thousand one hundred and 
eighteen to two thousand one hundred and twenty-two, for the 
loss or injury thereof from any cause whatever, except: 1. An 
inherent defect, vice. or weakness, or a spontaneous action, of 
the property itself: 2. The act of a public enemy of the United 
States. or of this state; 3. The act of the law; or, 4. Any irre-
sistible superhuman cause." (Civ. Code, § 2194.) Evidence 
[4] See 20 Oal.J'ur. 486; 39 A.m.Jur. 859. 
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was adduced that the claim was paid without reference to any 
negligence or tortious conduct on the part of the carrier. No 
release was given to the carrier by plaintiff. 
In the instant action plaintiff seeks to recover damages to 
its property flowing from the eollhdon, asserting that defend-
ant's negligence was the caURe of it. Defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict was granted solely upon the ground that 
plaintiff had been fully compensated for its loss by the carrier 
and that it was not a proper party plaintiff in this action. 
[la] Where a person suffers personal injury or property 
damage by reason of the wrongful act of another, an action 
against the wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not pre-
cluded nor is the amount of damages reduced by the receipt 
by him of payment for his loss from a source wholly inde-
pendent of the wrongdoer. (See Peri v. Los Ange7es Junction 
Ry., 22 Cal.2d 111 [137 P.2d 411): White v. Mary Ann, 6 Cal. 
462 [65 Am. Dec. 523]: Lebet v. Cappobiancho, 38 Cal.App.2d 
Supp. 771 [102 P.2d 11091: Inglewood Park M. Co. v. Fer-
guson, 9 Cal.App.2d 217 [48 P.2d 305); Loggie v. Interstate 
Transit Co., ]OS Cal.App. 165 f291 P. 618]; Clark v. Burns 
Hammam 'Bo.ths. 71 Cal. App. 571 [236 P. 152]; 18 A.L.R. 
67S; 22 Id. 155S: 81 Id. 320: ]5 Am.Jur., Damages, §§ 198-
202: 25 C .• T.S., Damages. ~ 99.) The rule has been applied 
where the independent source is pension systems or charity. 
The most typical case i!! where the person suffering the damage 
has procured insurance protecting himself again!!t the loss, to 
which the wrongdoer did not contribute in procuring, and 
his insurer pays him for the loss suffered. In the insurance 
cases its application i!! not prevented by the circumstance that 
the insurer is subrogated to the right.'1 of the insured person 
fll1ffering the damage as against the tort feasor. (See White 
v. Mary Ann, supra; Le'bet v. pappo'biancho, supra; Clark v. 
Bltrns "ammam Boths, supra; 15 Am.Jur., Damages, § 201.) 
The analogy between that rule and the instant case is close. 
[2] The liability of the carrier to the owner for damage to 
property in transit under the contract to transport is practi-
cally absolute. The few exceptions are stated in the statutory 
law. (Civ. Code, § 2194. above quoted.) His liability is that of a 
limited insurer whether it be said to be contractual (the stat-
ute forming part of the contract), statutory or in tort. (See 
Fran7din v. Southern Pac. Co., 203 Cal. 680 [265 P. 936, 59 
A.L.R.. 118]; Micha7itschke 'Bros. & Co. v. Wells, Fargo &7 Co., 
118 Cal. 683.[50 P. 847]; Scammon v. Wells, Fargo &7 Co., 84 
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Cal 311 [24 P. 284]; Bohannan v. Hammond, 42 CaL 227; 
American Fruit Distr~"b'Utor8 v. Hines, 55 Cal.App. 377 [203 
P. 821].) [lb] The recovery of the loss by the owner from the 
carrier comes from a source wholly independent of the tort 
feasor whose negligence caused the loss. Therefore under this 
rule plaintiff's action Ul not barred unless there are some 
other factors which compel it. 
It is suggested that if plaintiff-shipper is permitted to re-
cover from defendant tort feasor, the latter might be sub-· 
sequently subjected to a like recovery by the carrier. Thi'l the. 
law win not permit. We may look at the law of bailments for. 
an analogy. Assuming the carrier would have an action' 
against the tort feasor, and treating it as a bailee for the full· 
value of the property destroyed by the tort feasor, a previous 
recovery by the shipper from the tort feasor would be a bar to 
such action except to the extent the action was for damage to 
the specia] interest in the property of the carrier-bailee, and, 
conversely, recovery from the tort feasor by the carrier-bailee 
of the full value of the property would be a bar to a subse-
quent action by the shipper-bailor except to the extent the 
action was for injury special to the bailor. (Baggett v. Me-
COl'mack, 73 Miss. 552 [19 80. 89. 55 Am.St.Rep. 554], Cen-
tral R. Co. of New Jersey v. Bayway Refining Co., 81 N.J.L. 
456 [79 A. 292. Ann.Cas. 1912D 77]: nlinois Cent. R. Co. v. 
Sims, 77 Miss. 325 [27 So. 527. 49 L.R.A. 322] ; Terry v. Penn-
sylvania R. 00 .• 35 Del. 1 [156 A. 787] ; Masterson v. Interna-
tional & G. N. R1/. Co. (Tex.CiY.App.) 55 S.W. 577; 34 C.J. 
850-851; 6 Am.Jur .. BaiIments. § 358.) We are speaking here 
of actions against the tort feasor as distinguished from pay-
ment for the loss between the shipper and the carrier. If the 
carrier would haye such an action by reason of the principle 
of subrogation, the result is the same. At least where the 
carrier-subrogee has notice of the action by the shipper-sub-
rogor against the wrongdoer the satisfaction of a judgment 
obtained against the wrongdoer by the subrogor is a bar to 
an action by the subrogee against the tort feasor. (Lebet v. 
('nl)])obiancho. 38 Cal.App.2dSupp. 771 [102 P.2d 1109]; 
Kidd v. Ht71ma.n. 14 Cal.App.2d 507 r58 P.2d 662]; nlinois 
Oent. R. Co. v. Hicl:.7in. 13] Ky. 624 [115 S.W. 752, 23 L.R.A. 
N. s. 8701: Fidem" Tns. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 
165 N.C. ]~6 r80 S.E. 10691: J1Joltz v. Sherwood Bros., 116 Pat 
Super. 231 [176 ."... 842]; 140 A.L.R. 124].) The theory is 
that there are no longer any rights in the subrogor to which 
the subrogee may be subrogated.. 
) 
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The contention that the payment for the loss by the car-
rier to the plaintiff is a discharge of one joint tort feasor 
which discharges the other cannot be sustained. We have 
seen that th& ".l!l.~isputed evidence shows that the payment was 
not based on any tortious liability. The carrier's liability was 
absolute and not dependent upon any fault on its part. It was 
a discharge of a liability independent of any tort liability 
and not arising from the same basis as the liability of defend-
ant which is based on her tortious conduct, negligence. 
[3] A difficult question is presented when we come to the 
issue of whether or not defendant tort feasor may rely upon 
the defense of the contributory negligence of the carrier in 
an action by the plaintiff, shipper-owner. If the carrier was 
bringing the action against the tort feasor after having paid 
the shipper-owner the loss suffered by it, contributory negli-
gence of the carrier would be a good defense. (Rest., Restitu-
tion, § 94.) From that premise it is argued that if the shipper 
is permitted to recover in an action by it from the wrongdoer 
without being required to meet the defense of contributory 
negligence of the carrier, the latter will wholly avoid meeting 
that issue to its unjust advantage by recovery from the shipper 
after the latter has recovered from the defendant tort feasor. 
It has been held that the contributory negligence of the carrier 
may not be imputed to the shipper in the latter's action against . 
the tort feasor for his wrongful destruction of the goods, 
or in other words, that contributory negligence of the carrier 
is no defense in such an action. (Bower v. Unwn Pac. R. 00., 
106 Kan. 404 [188 P. 420].) But in a case where the carrier 
has paid the shipper-owner the loss suffered, we believe the 
more just rule to be that contributory negligence of the car-
rier is a defense. Otherwise the tort feasor would be deprived 
of his defense of contributory negligence which he would have 
against the carrier. The' latter should not be enabled to 
escape that defense by the method above mentioned. If the 
defense were not allowed, it might be said that the carrier, 
because of its contributory negligence could not recover from 
the shipper after it had paid the shipper and the latter had 
recovered from the tort feasor. That would permit double 
recovery by the shipper which is not favored. 
[4] The foregoing discussion also answers the contention 
that plaintiff shipper is not the real party in interest. The 
general test of such a party is: "It [Code of Civ. Proc., Sec. 
307] is to save a defendant, against whom a judgment may 
) 
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be obtained, from further harassment or vexation at the hands 
of other claimants to the tI8llle demand. It is to prevent a 
claimant from making a simulated transfer, and thus defeat-
ing any just eounterclaim or setoff which defendant would 
have to the demand if pressed by the real owner. But where 
the plaintiff shows such a title as that a judgment upon it 
satisfied by defendant will protect him from future annoyance 
or loss, and where, as against the party suing, defendant can 
urge any defenses he could make against the real owner, then 
there is an end of the defendant's concern and with it of his ! 
right to object; for, so far as he is interested, the action is 
being prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." 
(Giselman v. Starr, 106 Cal. 651, 657 [40 P. 8].) .As we have 
seen, such protection is afforded in the case at bar. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
eurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. In my opinion plaintiff's action 
is barred on the ground that plaintiff has been fully com-
pensated by the carrier for the injury to its goods and would 
be unjustly enriched by a double recovery. 
"When the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full for 
the injury done him, from whatever source it may come, he 
is so far affected in equity and good conscience, that the law 
will not permit him to recover again for the same damages." 
(Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. (U.S.) 1, 17 [18 L.Ed. 129J; 
Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa 575 [79 N.W. 344J; The Beacons-
field, 158 U.S. 303, 307 [15 s.Ct. 860, 39 L.Ed. 993J ; Le Blond 
Schacht Trucle Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 34 
OhioApp.478 [171 N.E. 414); Hart v. Western R. R. Corp., 
54 Mass. (13 Met.) 99, 105 t46 Am.Dec. 719].) Whether the 
persons who are responsible to the plaintiff have acted jointl~­
or separately is immaterial. for the controlling questions are 
whether the 10&<; for which they are responsible is identical 
and whether the payment by one of them has fully compen-
sated the plaintiff. As this court stated with respect to an 
injury for which several persons were responsible: "Whether 
is was caused by their joint or several acts is immaterial. It 
would be subordinating substance to mere form to say that 
these two actions do not under the circumstances rest upon 
_e ucl the laDle cause. This being so, and it appearing that 
) 
) 
June 1946] ANHEUSER-BusCH, INC. tJ. STABLEY 353 
(211 C.2d 347; 170 P.2d 448] 
plaintiff had been once compensated for the injury suffered, 
the court below was right in denying her a second award of 
damages for the same act." (Butler v. Ashworth, 110 Cal. 
614,620 [43 P. 4,386].) "Where the bar accrues in favor of 
some of the wrongdoers by reason of what has been received 
from . . . one or more othel'!< . . . the bar arises, not from 
any particular form. that the proceeding assumes, but from 
the fact that the injured party has actually received satis-
faction .... " (Dawson v. Schloss, 93 Cal. 194, 199 [29 P. 
31]; Tompkins v. Clay Street R. R. Co., 66 Cal. 163. 166 [4 P. 
1165] ; Urton v. Price, 57 Cal. 270, 272.) 
Since the rule against double recovery is aimed at prevent-
ing unjust enrichment, it is not only immaterial whether 
plaintiff has one or several causes of action against tort feasors, 
but whether one of his causes of action is based on contract 
and the other on tort, whether the one requires proof of negli-
gence and the other does not. The decisive consideration in 
barring an action seeking double recovery is that plaintiff 
shall not recover twice for his loss by taking advantage of the 
fortuitous circumstance that more than one person is re-
sponsible to him for that loss. (Prosser, Torts, 1105-1107; 
see, also. Ash v. Mortensen. 24 Cal.2d 654,657 [150 P.2d 876]; 
Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150 [106 A. 602] ; Coleman v. Gulf 
Refining Co., 172 Ark. 428 [289 S.W. 2].) 
AB a bailee the CIl.rrier had a right to bring an action for 
damages for the injui"Y to the goods in its custody, even before 
it compensated the bailor for its loss. (Armstrong v. Kubo & 
Co., 88 Cal.App. 331,334 [263 P. 365); Bode v. Lee, 102 Cal. 
583 [36 P. 936]; Roberts v. Burr, 135 Cal. 156, 161 [67 P. 
46] : Whithwor;th v. Jones, 58 Cal.App. 492, 497 [209 P. 60]; 
Burkett v. United States, 71 F.2d 683; The Beaconsfield, 158 
U.S. 303, 307 [15 S.Ct. 860, 39 L.Ed. 993]; Juniata Accep-
tance Corp. v. Hoffman, 1391 Pa.Super. 87 [11 A.2d 494]; 
Nee Rest., Judgments, § 88(2); Holmes, The Common Law, 
167 et seq.) Damages for the injury to the goods, which it 
would recover as trustee for its bailor before it paid the 
bailor's damages, could be recovered by the carrier on its OWl} 
account after it had satisfied the bailor. Since the carrier's 
damages, including its outlay to compensate its bailor, would 
determine its cause of action against defendant, it is clear 
that the carrier would have to deduct from its claim the 
amount it had received as a result of the sale of part of the 
) 
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goods that were salvagcd as wcll as the value of the goods 
remaining in its hands. If plaintiff is entitled to bring the 
present action, however, it is difficult to see on what theory 
it would be required to deduct from its claim the procceds of 
the sale of the salvaged goods or the value of the goods remain-
ing in the hands of the carrier. The sale was made, not for 
the account of plaintiff, but for the account of the carrier 
who received the proceed~ thereof, and the goods remaining 
in the hands of the carrier are no lonr:rer the plaintiff's since i 
it has received from the carrier the full Rmount for which it 
could have sold the goods had they arrived safely at their , 
destination. Moreover. if plaintiff (\ould bring this action, it 
is not clear why, as the majorit~, opinion state.c:;. defendant 
could raise the defense of contrihutory negligence. It is set-
tled that contributor~' negli!rence of the carrier is no defense 
in an action for damages to the goods of a shipper brought by 
the sMpper against one who has injured the goods. (Hornstein 
v. Kramer Bros. etc. Lines. 133 F.2d 143. 147: see 2 Rest., ! 
Torts, § 489: Prosser, Torts, 425, and cases there cited.) To 
hold that in the present action defendant is entitled to raise 
that defense because plaintiff i~ already fully compensated 
for its damage.~ by the carrier woula simply mean that plain-
tiff cannot bring an action for it~ ()wn account and is merely 
suing as a trustee for the carrier. Plaintiff, however, has not 
brought this action as a trustee nor doe.., it want to be treated 
as such, for it has taken the position that contributory negli-
gence of the carrier cannot be set up against it on the ground 
that its cause of action is different from that of the carrier. 
Although plaintiff concede." that it has received full compen-
sation for it.., loss from the carrier and has even turned over 
to the carrier what was received from the sale of the salvaged 
goods, it brings this action as if it were entitled in its own righ1 
to the damages it see~ from defendant. Plaintiff has offered 
no. reasonable explanation wh~' this action is brought by i1 
rather than by the carrier. The conclusion seems inescapable 
that the purpose is to defeat legitimate defenses that defend- . 
ant might have against the carrier. 
It is contended that the rule against double recovery does 
not apply to this action on the grounds that plaintiff recovered 
from the carrier by virtue of its contract and that its claim 
thereunder is independent of any claim against defendant as 
a tort feasor. In support of this contention an analogy to an 
insuranee contract is invoked. It is asserted that had plain-
') 
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tiff been compensated under an insurance contract it would 
not be barred from bringing an action against one who in-
jured its goods, and that similarly it should not be barred 
because it has reC'cived compensation for its loss under a con-
tract with a common carrier whose liability for the damages, 
like that of an in~urer. doe!'! not depend on any fault of its 
OWll. 
CertaIn insurance benefits are regarded as the proceeds of 
an investment rather than as an indemnity for damages. 
Thus it has been held that the proceeds of a life insurance con-
tract made for a fixed sum rather than for the damages caused 
by the death of the insured are proceeds of an investment and 
can be receh'ed independently of the claim for damage!' 
against the person who caused the death of the insured. The 
same rule ha!'! been held applicable to accident insurance COll-
tracts. AP. to both kind~ of insurance it ha~ been stated: 
"Such a policy is an im'estment contract, giving the owner or 
beneficiary an '1 b!':olute right, independent of the right against 
an~' third person re.-;ponsible for the injury covered by the 
policy,'· (Gatzweiler v. llliZu)Q1lkee Elec. By. & L. Co., 136 
Wis. 34 [116 N.W. 633.128 Am.St.Rep. 1057, 16 Anll.Cas. 633, 
18 L.R.A.N.S. 211]: Suttles v. Railway Mail Assn., 156 App. 
Div.435 [141 N.Y.S. 1024. 10261; see 18 A.L.R. 678: 95 A.L.R. 
575: 29 Am.,lur. 1003-4.) Hence in the case of life or acci-
dent insurance. the insure}', in the absence of a provision to 
the cont.rary in the insurance contract, ha~ no right to be sub· 
rogated to the right!': of the owner or beneficiary of the policy 
against t.he wrong-doer who caused the insured's death or 
injury. An insurer who fully compensates the insured. how-
ever. is subrogated t.o the right.~ of the insured against one 
who injured his property if the insurance was for the pro-
tection of the propert~' of the insured, and was therefore an 
indemnity eontract. (See Vance, Insurance (2d ed.), 668· 
6SJ: 6 Appleman. Insurance. ~§ 4051. 4052; 29 Am.Jur. 999-
1001. IOO~-1004.) In s1.1('h cases subrogation is the means by 
which double recovery by the owner iq prevented and the ulti-
mate burden shift<,d to the wrongdoer where it belongs. (Hat·t 
v. Western R. R. ('orp., !l4 l\Iass. (13 Met.) 99. 105 [46 Am. 
Dec. il 91.) Th<, wrong-doer mllst bear the ultimate burden 
of the injury and cmm01 e."Icape liability because the owner is 
iwmred. for tl1<' insurance was not taken for th<' h('nrfit of the 
wl'Ong(loer but for thnt of the owner. 
So long as there was no merger of law and equity procedure 
) 
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an insurance company subrogated to the right of the insured 
could not bring an action at law but could only sue in equity 
when it availed itself of the rights of its insured against a 
third person. (See cases collected; 96 A.L.R. 864; Clark, Code 
Pleading, 109.) The result was that the insured had to bring 
the action in his own name, and the defendant could not raise 
the defense that the insured was paid for his damages because 
the allowance of such a defense would, for procedural reasons, 
have defeated any recovery against the wrongdoer. Since 
courts have recognized that under modern procedure one who 
is subrogated to the rights of another can bring any action that 
the other could have brought, they have also recognized that 
when the insured is fully compensated for his property dam-
ages by an insurer, the latter may bring an action for the dam-
ages against a third person and that if the insured brings 
the action he can do so only as a trustee for the insurer. 
(Harrington v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 169 Okla. 255 
{a6 P.2d 738, 96 AL.R. 859]; Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Bremner, 
25 F.2d 75, 76; see Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 120 i 
[228 P. 11] ; cases collected 96 A.L.R. 868, 869; 29 Am.Jur. 
1016; 6 Appleman, Insurance, p. 604; see, also Lord &; Taylor 
v. Yale &; Towne Mfg. Co., 230 N.Y. 132, 141 [129 N.E. 346); 
Vahlsing, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.), 108 
S.W.2d 947; Clark, Code Pleading, 109-110.) 
In the present case the defendant does not escape liability 
if plaintiff is barred from bringing this action, for defendant 
is liable to the carrier for any injury suffered by the carrier 
caused by defendant's negligence. Since the carrier has a 
cause of action of its own for all its damages the equitable 
doctrine of subrogation is not needed; the amount of the car-
rier's damages is simply increased by the fact that it was liable 
to plaintiff for the injury to plaintiff's goods and has com-
pensated plaintiff therefor. 
It appears, th~refore, that if plaintiff is sUiiig-iiiiti-oWil------
right, it cannot recover compensatory damages for the wrong, 
for it has been fully compensated for all of its actual damages. 
If plaintiff is not suing in its own right, it has failed to bring 
itself within any justifiable exception to the requirement of 
modern pleading that an action must be maintained by the 
real party in interest. The only purpose the action can serve 
is somehow to defeat the defenses that the defendant may 
have against the carrier. This court should not lend its aid 
to the accomplishment of such a purpose. 
